



¶ 4. Technical and scientific <sup>examination</sup> ~~analysis~~ of plants ~~could~~, however, be supplemented by <sup>analysis of</sup> other types of information which have already been utilized to the extent available in the preparation of intelligence estimates of the Soviet atomic program.

~~If the~~ ~~age~~ Provided the plan permitted ~~the~~ adequate access to such auxiliary information, verification of past <sup>Soviet</sup> production would be greatly facilitated. of particular value would be <sup>of the Ministry involved and each of its subordinate</sup> records, ~~including~~ covering uranium mining ~~and~~ reduction and transport, process chemicals, power consumption, ~~and~~ ~~fixed~~ and payrolls, etc. In addition, access to records of the supporting economy would provide additional check points.

This is obviously necessary at some time. My view is, however,  
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discussion; so if the ABC paper is modified in a general way along  
the lines indicated on the second typed page, we and State can  
live with it. i.e. all we want to avoid is rejection of disarm ab initio on  
account of statements that verification can't work at all.

1. What is range of error of current intelligence estimates as

to plutonium + U-235 production in USSR?

To what extent?

2. <sup>intelligence</sup> Are the sources of these estimates such that they  
(at a future time)  
could be used for indicating falsity of Soviet declarations?

~~3.~~

~~3.~~ This involves two things:

security ~~and~~ considerations + the likelihood that

these types of information would continue to be available.

3. What additional sources for estimates would become  
(or could be suggested for inclusion in the plan)  
available for.

a. Direct estimate at facilities

b. Collateral estimate through general economy

etc.?

4. How much would the methods in 3 refine the

accuracy of the estimates?

5. What resultant range in terms of most effective

(using percentage of error)

conceivable weapon conversion, set against present estimates

for: 9 Dec PB mg

*[Handwritten signature]*



Roughly speaking, 6 kg = 1 cur

2.3 cur + boosting material can  
make 1 multi megaton bomb.

Ergo whether your margin of error  
is a few score or a few hundred kg  
the result is quite a menace

• Maybe - but suppose a kg takes X tons  
if or etc etc -